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LUTHER H. THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

CASE NO. 13547

vs .

i

GLEN PETERSON,
Defendant-Appellant,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
^i

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE

)

This is an action to forfeit and terminate the
interest of the Defendant JoeTs Valley, Inc. in and to the
property known as Joe's Valley Marina by virtue of a sales
agreement between Plaintiff and said Defendant, containing
title retaining and forfeiture provisions and to quiet title
to said property as against persons claiming through the
Defendant Joe!s Valley, Inc., including the Defendant Glen
Peterson.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-2DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower Court held that the interest of the
Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc., in the property known as Joe's
Valley Marina, acquired by reason of the sales agreement
referred to repeatedly herein as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2,
was forfeited and terminated and that all persons claiming
by and through said Defendant, including the Defendant Glen
Peterson had no right, title or interest therein and
declared that Plaintiff was the owner thereof.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff, seeks to affirm the decision of the
lower Court,
STATEMENT OF FACTS ,
Plaintiff does not agree with Appellant's Statement
of Facts and herein recites said facts as he sees them.

The

specific differences regarding said facts are largely set out
in Plaintiff's Argument No. V.

Since the pages of the reporter'

transcript and the record contain duplicate numbers, the pages
of the reporters transcrip will be referred to herein by the
designation U T " and the pages of the record by the designation "

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-3Plaintiff-Respondent, Luther H. Thomas, an
unsophisticated individual (He said that he had no knowledge
of how to form a corporation and didn't know what an
incorporator was although he was listed as one ,/T 42 & 43/.
He referred to the Corporate Charter as it first set of ByLaws /T 101, 102, 110/ -- Counsel for Defendant was able to
confuse him regarding his status as owner of the assets of
the Marina vs. his status as the owner of stock of the
•*k

*>•

corporation /T 46, 47, 48, 53, 64 & 637) built the property
known as Joe's Valley Marina (distinguished from Joe's Valley
Marina, Inc., a corporation which later changed its name to
Joe's Valley, Inc.) from scratch from his own savings (T 6) and
with monies borrowed from his sister-in-law and her husband,
the Falsones (T 23 & 66).

$
\%
•At'

Because of his failing health (T 5 & 6), he
wished to dispose of the Marina and agreed to sell it to a
group of 11 men (T 7 & 8) who intended to operate it and
other properties (a coal mine and concrete batch plant /T 19 & i
through a corporation which they then formed for that purpose
--Joe's Valley Marina, Inc. (T 7)

They apparently also intendei

to promote a public stock offering (T 62).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Plaintiff

-4testified that he entered into a pre-incorporation agreement
with those same men (T 7 & 8) which was later incorporated into
the agreement between Plaintiff and the corporation, referred
to in the transcript as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2, the
admissability of which was the subject of much discussion at
the trial.

That agreement was signed by Julian R. Taylor, the

President of the corporation from the time of its inception
and the person whom all parties testified initiated or caused
almost all of the corporate acts (he was the President from
the beginning — he carried most of the corporate papers in
his briefcase and he obtained the services of the corporation
attorney and accountant and dealt with them without the
presence or advice of other members of the corporation.
/T 12, 13, 17, 39, 44, 71, 73, 91/)
The execution of said agreement (Ex 2) was admitted
by the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc., the corporation that
executed it, but was denied for lack of knowledge or
information by the Defendant Glen Peterson. (R 52) The
evidence was clear that Plaintiff had the entire interest in
the Marina property prior to his entanglement with the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-5promoters of Joe's Valley, Inc. (T 45 & 47) and there was
no evidence of Plaintiff's alienation of that interest other
than by that agreement.

The agreement was admitted in

evidence by the Court and the Court specifically found, both
in its Memorandum Decision and in its Findings of Fact (T 100,
101, 104 & 105), that it was the agreement of the Plaintiff and
the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc.

The agreement (Ex. 2)

provided for the sale of the Marina property for various considerations therein recited, including an agreement to pay
the Plaintiff's debt to the Falsones in the sum of $20,000.00
plus accrued interest, and for the immediate transfer without
any kind of record encumbrance of the "use permit" which is
the license agreement of the U. S. Forest Service to use
the property in question, and can fairly be described as the
cornerstone of the Marina property.

The agreement further

contained title retaining provisions and alternative forfeiture
provisions in the event of default (Ex. 2).
Defendant, Joe's Valley, Inc. almost fully failed
to perform said agreement (T 175 & 177) and the Plaintiff
received no consideration for it.

He eventually began the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-6instant action to declare the interest of the Defendant
Joe's Valley, Inc. and all those claiming by or through
it, including the Defendant Glen Peterson, forfeited and
terminated and to regain possession of the Marina
property (Rl-12).
The Defendant Glen Peterson, who describes himself
as a "promoter" (T 116) early in 1973, together with one
Dave Parsons, sought to obtain an exchange of stock of
Joe's Valley, Inc. for the stock of a corporation called
Omega Silver Corporation (T 117, 120 - 121). In that
connection he further attempted to obtain agreements to satisfy
the debts of the Thomases and Falsones by paying them with
Omega Silver Stock (T 121, 128). An agreement was apparently
reached between Omega Silver Corporation and Joe's Valley, Inc.
which was later abandoned or rescinded when an attorney for one
of them pointed out a flaw in their scheme to sell stock to
the public.

At the time of the trial, less than one year

later, the Defendant Peterson testified that Omega Silver
Corporation was "pretty much defunct". (T 135)

In connection

with their efforts on behalf of Omega Silver Corporation,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-7Peterson and Parsons had many contacts with certain of the
officers and directors of Joe's Valley, Inc., with the Plaintiff
Thomas and with the Falsones, (T 120-130) as a result, of which
they had full knowledge of the agreement between the Plaintiff
Thomas and the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc.

They or the

Defendant Glen Peterson, whose knowledge is pertinent hereto,
were also aware that the agreement was in default because of

*

the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc.,'s almost total failure to

f

perform including their failure to pay the Falsones as they
had agreed (T 130-131).

In that connection Glen Peterson

was advised in a meeting with this writer and the Falsones

|

shortly before he claimed to have entered into the agreement
with the defendant Joe's Valley, Inc. on which his claim

f
>i

H
herein is predicated, that it would be pointless for the
F^sones to deal with them (Omega) unless provisions were
made to pay the Thomases (which provisions had not been made)
because absent such provision, the Thomases would take the
Marina property back in accordance with their title retaining
contract.

He was further advised that the Thomases intended

to wait until the failure of the September 1st payment to
bring their action. (T130 - 131)
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-8In that state of affairs, Defendant Peterson acting
this time for himself personally, went to three of the
Twelve Directors (By-Laws of Joe's Valley, Inc., Plaintiff's
Exhibit 4, Article III, Section 1) and obtained an agreement
to lease with an option to buy, the Marina property. (Ex. 10).
The agreement, a typical promoter designed contract,
provided for a rent of 207o of the net income from the
operation of the Marina.

There was no undertaking to operate

the Marina in accordance with any specified standard, or at all.
The lease further provided that it was entered into subject
to the written approval of the U. S. Department of Agriculture,
Forest Service (Ex. 10), which approval was never obtained. (T 138)
Note that at the time three of twelve Directors
of the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc. entered into that
Agreement, they were in default -- knew that the Marina property
would be re-taken from them by the Thomases and therefore had
nothing to lose and hopefully something to gain by acquiesing
in the proposal of Peterson.

Thereafter, one of those

Directors, Robert Carnivali, who is also the SecretaryTreasurer of the corporation was able to locate almost no
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-9records (see page 89 where he first denied knowledge of a
notice of intent to Dissolve the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc.,
filed prior to the execution of the Lease Agreement with Peterson
and then when his signature on the N0tice was pointed out to
him, acknowledged that he had signed said Notice) or recall
any act of the corporation (T 71, 75, 90) other than that
transaction with the Defendant Peterson about which he had a
clear recollection.

He also acknowledged the reimbursement

by Peterson for some expenses he claimed he had assumed just
a few days before trial (T 96).

I

In May 1974, just prior to the onset of the 1974
marina season, Plaintiff brought a Motion for Summary Judgment.
At the Hearing for said Motion, parties urged upon the Court
the urgency as to time of determination as to who should have
possession of the Marina property.

The Court while denying

the Motion for Summary Judgment offered and proposed a trial
setting approximately 2-1/2 weeks hence, although no Notice
of Readiness for Trial had been filed.

All parties agreed and

the matter was heard at that time.
At the trial, Plaintiff simply subpoenaed the
Secretary-Treasurer of the corporation and his books and
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

;

i^s-

-10-

records without benefit of a prior examination of records
or a prior conversation or deposition of the Secretary-Treasurer.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

PLAINTIFF'S TITLE RETAINING CONTRACT IS ENFORCEABLE
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT PETERSON BECAUSE HE HAD
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF IT WHEN HE ACQUIRED THE
LEASE THROUGH WHICH HE NOW CLAIMS.

There is apparently no question but that there
was no performance by Joe's Valley, Inc. of its agreement
(T 175-177) and that Plaintiff was entitled to forfeit and
terminate the agreement and as between it and said Defendant,
regain possession and title to the Marina property.

The

question is only whether the Defendant Peterson obtained an
interest that for some reason survived that forfeiture and
termination.

This is the question argued extensively on

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support thereof (R 87-92), and
the only real question in the lawsuit.

The rest are in

reality afterthoughts thrown in, in a specious attempt to
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-11either confuse the trial Court or avoid its decision.
Plaintiff admits that he did not file a copy of
his Security Agreement with the Secretary of State as provided
in UCH 70A-9-401 (1) (D) and as such (assuming the UCC is
applicable) had only an unperfected Security Interest.
Plaintiff contends first that the Forest Service
Use Permit is an interest in real property as set forth in
UCA 70A-9-104 which provides:
"This Chapter does not apply:
(a--i) - not applicable
(j) except to the extent that provision
is made for fixtures in section 70A-9-313, to the
creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on
real estate including a lease or rents thereunder;-Plaintiff points out that the instrument through
which Defendant Peterson claims, is styled a "Lease11 and
describes a parcel of land in the North half of Section 6,
Township 18 South, Range 6 East, (Ex. 9) etc.

Plaintiff

admittedly cannot find a case characterizing the application
of that Section of UCC to a "use permit" and is therefore
confined to a naked argument that the essential nature of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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$p&
-12a "use permit11 is an interest in real property that strongly
resembles a lease of such real property.
(Ex. 9) provides:
,, ,v

The permit itself
"

"

"Permission is hereby granted -- to use subject
to the following conditions set out below, the
following conditions set out below, the following
described lands and improvements for the period
of 16 years,
The-* legal description is here sit out. In the
interest of space, it is npt repeated herein,
containing 10.4 acres!!
!

ltJ fdlldws that the;' transaction is specifically

excluded frorh the Uniform Commercial Code/
If it"is included and Defendant-Petitioner is
to avoid Plaintiff's security interest it must be pursuant
to the provisions of UCA 70A-9-301 which provides:
l!

(l) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection
(2) an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of,
(a) - not applicable
7 (b) - not applicable
(c) - in the case of Goods instruments,
documents, and chattel papers, a person who is not
a secured party and who is a transferee in bulk or
other buyer not in ordinary course of business, to
the extent that he gives value and receives delivery
of the colateral without knowledge of the security
!!
interest and before it is perfected;
That section provides three criteria for priority.
The persons seeking such priority must,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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-13(a)

Receive delivery of the collateral.

In the instant case, Peterson acknowledged that he
never obtained such possession.
(b)

Receive such delivery without knowledge

of the security interest.

In that connection, Plaintiff's

evidence indicates that the Plaintiff told Defendant
Peterson about his sales contract and gave him a copy (T 21 & 22)
Mrs. Thomas testified that she complained to him that they
had an agreement; that they needed money and that the
agreement had not been performed (T 157 - 159) Moreover,
much of Defendant Peterson's activity -- his dealings with
the Thomases and particularly his dealings with the Falsones,
was obviously done to satisfy the requirements of that
agreement (T 120-130).
Perhaps the most damning evidence of Defendant
Peterson's knowledge is disclosed by the following questions
asked him at trial and his answers thereto, at pages 130 and
131 of the transcript.
"Q.

All right, then do you recall my telling you

at that time that we could not enter into an agreement with
you providing for payment out of the operation of the marina

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-14because if you didn't take care of the obligation to the
Thomas' they would take the marina away from both of us?
A.

That's right, you did tell me that,

Q.

And you told me that the obligation to the

Thomas1 had been paid, the Thomas' would -A.

That arrangements had been made.

Q.

And I told you that the Thomas1 and their attorney

did not agree with that did I not?
A.

You did.

I would assume.

Q.

I further told you that there was a twenty-two

thousand dollar payment due September 1st that had to be
paid or that, or the Thomas1 would take the property back?
A.

And I told you to show me documentation.

Q.

Do you recall asking me to show you documentation?

A.

I do absolutely.

Q.

What did I say?

A.

What?

Q.

What do you claim I said?

A.

You didn't show me any documentation.

Q.

But I did tell you that Thomas1 had a title

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-15-

retaining contract?
A.

Yes you did.

You told me they had money coming,

you didn't tell me, I don't recall title retaining contract.
You may have said it, but I don't recall that in particular.
Q.

But I did tell you that if the obligation to

the Thomas1 due in just a couple of months to pay twenty-two
thousand wasn't paid that the Thomas1 would be in position
to take the marina away from both you and us?
A.

That's right you did tell me that."

The Court found in its memorandum Decision,
and in its Findings of Fact, that the Defendant Peterson had
full knowledge of said sales agreement and that it was in
default when he attempted to acquire an interest in the Marina
property (R 105, para. 5 and R 100, beg. at top of page).
Plaintiff urges that its findings were correct and required
by the evidence.
Even if Defendant's knowledge was imperfect and
Plaintiff contends the contrary, prior cases say tha

he

had such notice as to excite his attention or put him on guard
he should be deemed conversant of such facts as a reasonable
inquiry would lead him to.

This Court in O'Reilly vs.

McLean, 84 U. 551, 37 P. 2d 70 noted.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16M

Whatever is notice enough to excite attention
and put the party on his guard and call for inquiry
is notice of everything which inquiry might have
led. When such a person has sufficient information
to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant
of it."
The Court in that case involving water rights
concluded that the subsequent purchaser had a duty to
inquire as to whether the transferee of a portion of the
land to which they applied had acquired the water rights
in question and charged said purchaser with notice of that
party's right, in spite of the dissenting Judge's conclusion,
that the record was clear that he had no actual notice.
The Court in Universal CIT Corporation vs. Courtesy
Motors, 8 U. 2nd 275, 333 P. 2d 628, quoted the same language
concluding that the purchaser of an automobile had a duty
to inquire as to the contents of a missing portion of the
Bill of Sale, when its torn condition put him on notice
thereof.

In Meager vs. Dean, 27 U. 173, 91 P. 2d 454, this

Court held that notice of the possession of the tenant of
real property was notice of possession of the landlord and
imposed a duty to inquire as to the landlord's interest.

j$&'

{'M-*
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In the O'Reilly vs. McLean case, the Court held the purchaser
of real property had a duty of inquiry as to the status of
a mortgage which he knew existed even though it was not
disclosed by the record, even though his landlord had mislead
him as to its validity.
(c)

The third criteria is that he gets priority

only to the extent that he gives value.

T 136 indicates

j|

the following question asked of the Defendant Peterson and

II

the following answer given.

f|

M

Q

But you have not paid anything to Joe's Valley,

Inc. as a consideration for the lease that you claim?
A

Well, not on that.

ui

No, I guess I haven't.f!

1

In summary, Plaintiff contends that the "use

jfe

permit" is an interest in real estate within the meaning
#-

of UCA 70A-9-104 (j) and is therefore excluded from the
provisions of UCC;

That in any event the defendant Peterson

is not a person who can take priority pursuant to UCA 70A-9-301 (c)
because he did not take possession; did not get possession
without knowledge and was in any event entitled to priority
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only to the extend he gave consideration and he gave no
consideration.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT PETERSON NEVER ACQUIRED AN
INTEREST IN THE MARINA PROPERTY BECAUSE THE
LEASE - OPTION AGREEMENT THROUGH WHICH HE
CLAIMS IS BY ITS OWN TERMS SUBJECT TO THE
WRITTEN APPROVAL OF THE FOREST SERVICE
WHICH WAS NEVER OBTAINED.

The lease-option agreement provides (Ex. 10)
in paragraph 8,
"8. It is mutually understood and agreed that this
lease and the agreements and provisions contained
herein are entered into subject to the written
approval of the United States Department of
Agriculture, Forest Service.11
That approval was never obtained.

Defendant

Appellant Peterson admits at page 27 of his brief that it
was not obtained, but claims that it was not obtained
by reason of the action of Plaintiff, the Defendant Joe!s
Valley, Inc. or unspecified third parties -- but he points

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-19-

to no evidence that such approval was frustrated by anyone,
nor does he explain why his failure to obtain such
approval, it caused by Plaintiff or especially if caused
by unspecified third parties, should avoid that term of
his lease.
Plaintiff urges that even if Defendant Peterson
was such a purchaser for value that his claim was entitled
to priority over the title retaining forfeiture claim of
Plaintiff, his failure to obtain possession or title by
the terms of his own contract, while the right or power
to transfer title or possession of the party with whom he
contracted (Joe's Valley, Inc.) was terminated, frustrates
his ability^to obtain title of possession from the said
Joe!s Valley, Inc. now or at some future time.

The party

with whom he contracted no longer has the means of fulfilling
the executory contract.

If the Defendant Peterson has a

remedy it is with the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc,, the
party with whom he contracted.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-20-

POINT H I
THE SALES CONTRACT WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED BY THE
TRIAL COURT -- DEFENDANT PETERSON HAS NO STANDING
TO OBJECT, SINCE THE DEFENDANT JOEfS VALLEY, INC.
WITH WHOM THE CONTRACT WAS MADE, ADMITTED IT.
Plaintiff's principle action was against the
Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc., to declare the contract with
that Defendant forfeited and terminated.
Plaintiff's Complaint /R 6 & 7/).

(see Prayer of

Paragraph 2 of Plaintiff's

Complaint alleged the signing and execution of the sales
contract in question on the 19th day of April, 1972 (R 12).
Copy of the sales contract was annexed to the Complaint,
Exhibit "A" (R 1 - 5). Joe's Valley, Inc. admitted the
allegations of paragraph 2 of Plaintiff's Company (R 86).
29 Am Jur 740, Evidence, Section 687, states the
general rule.
"it is one of the elementary rules of pleading
that a party is not required to prove those
allegations admitted by his adversary to be true."
See also annotations at 14 A.L.R. 87, Supplemented at
90 A.L.R. 1411 (an examination of the Blue Book Supplement
by this writer did not locate a Utah case.)
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-21In the instant case, Plaintiff contends that in as
much as the contract was between Plaintiff and the Defendant
Joe's Valley, Inc., it was necessary to construe it only as
between those parties, and the Defendant Peterson was not
competent to object to the introduction of it since the
parties to the contract each relied on it and where one
party claims by it in his complaint and the other admitted it
in his answer.

When the Court determined that the interest

in the Marina property of the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc.
should be forfeited and terminated pursuant to the terms of
the contract between those contracting parties, it had then
only to further determine, whether other parties claiming
through Joe's Valley, Inc. had for some reason obtained an
interest in the property with a priority superior to that of
Plaintiff's, and absent that, to conclude that said parties
did not have an interest in the property, their remedy if any,
being upon their contract with Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc.
with whom they dealt.

But the propriety of admitting said

contract does not depend on the foregoing.

Article IV,

Section 7 of the By-Laws (Ex. 4) of the Defendant Joe's
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-22Valley, Inc. which had been admitted in evidence, provides
for the duties of the President, as follows:
"He shall sign and make all contracts and
agreements in the name of the corporation,
and see that they are properly carried out."
The provision relating to the duties of the
Board of Directors, Article III, Section 9, say generally
the directors shall have the control and general management
of the affairs and business of the corporation; they shall
fix compensation of the officers and sell shares of stock
of the corporation.

They did not provide that they shall

authorize the execution of contracts entered into by the
corporation directly or inferrentially.

Plaintiff contends

the authority to make a contract by the President and in
the absence of a delegation of authority to the Board of
Directors to approve such contracts, renders the contract
signed by the President binding against the corporation and
consequently proof that it was signed by the President for
the corporation proves that it was a contract of the
corporation.

It was competent for the By-Laws to provide that

the President should make the contracts of the corporation.
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In that regard UCA 16-10-25 provides in part:
"The By-Laws may contain any provision for the
regulation and management of the affairs of the
corporation not inconsistent with law or Articles
of Incorporation.11

It will be helpful to here review the evidence
before the Court when it admitted the sales contract, (Ex. 2)
Plaintiff testified the contract was signed by the President,
Julian Taylor, at a meeting of the Board of Directors.

He

samed seven of the Directors that were present at the
meeting (T 10 & 11). (Article III, Section A of the By-Laws
provides that a majority of the twelve Directors shall constitute a quorum)

He further testified that he missed some

of what went on in the meeting, as he was examining the
contract (T 11). He testified that he had never transferred
his interest in the property known as Joe's Valley Marina
except by that contract (T 65 & 66) and a pre-corporation
agreement by and between the same parties containing the same
provisions as Ex. 2 (T 8), that was preliminary to and
preceded said Ex. 2.

There was abundant testimony that the
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-24Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc. had taken possession and control
of the Marina and there was no explanation of any authorization
for their doing so, except the subject sales agreement.
Plaintiff could not testify as to the specific
vote of the Board of Directors regarding the approval of the
contract and he did not produce a minute record of the Board
of Directors approving such authorization.

In that regard

the Secretary-Treasurer of the Corporation who had been
supoenaed by Plaintiff testified that he was aware of the
sales agreement in question but did not have any of the minute
records and he did not know what happened to them (T 75).
The testimony of said Secretary - Treasurer was vague and
Plaintiff contends and the Court held in its Memorandum
Decision (para 2, R 101) that his testimony taken as a
whole indicated that the books and records of the corporation
were carelessly and imperfectly kept.
On that state of evidence of the Court admitted
the sales agreement, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 in evidence and
in his Memorandum Decision and in his Findings of Fact held
that it was the agreement of the parties.
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-25In the 1961 case of Peterson vs. Holmgren Land
& Livestock Company, 12 U 2nd 125, 363 P. 2d 786, this
Court quoted with approval a rule stated in Am Jur as follows:
!l

If a corporate officer assumes or contracts on
behalf of the corporation, at least one to whom
authority to make such a contract may be given,
a person dealing with him in good faith is not
affected by the fact that the proper steps to
clothe him with such authority were not taken."
''.•'''

•

;

^
.r^§;";'

••'•"

It was contended as here, that there was no evidence
of authorization by the Directors of the corporation for the
execution of the contract.

The Court pointed out that the

Minutes were for the most part written in a brief and
indefinite manner.

Plaintiff urges that the ostensible

*\

authority relied on by the Court in Peterson case, is
substantially less adequate than that shown in the instant
case, where the By-Laws of which Plaintiff, the party entering
into the contract, was aware, specifically stated that the
President had authority to make contracts for the corporation.
Judge Sheya in his Memorandum Decision, found that
the books and records of the corporation were so carelessly
and imperfectly kept as to not show the acts of the corporation
and cited 29 Am Jur 2nd 536 as authority for the proposition
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that in such event such acts can be proved by parol, in the
absence of statute to the contrary.

Plaintiff believes that

he cannot gainsay the Court's statement and merely endorses i
The corporation Joe!s Valley, Inc. accepted and
retained the benefits of the sales contract in question.
(This action and appeal arises because of an alleged lease
and sale of the property the corporation received from the
Plaintiff through said sales contract.)

7 Fletcher

Encyclopedia corporations Section 3011 (1964 Revised)
Volume 7, Page 79, recites the rule as follows:
"In like manner a corporation which has
received the consideration of a contract cannot
defend against an action on the contract on the
ground that the provisions of the Statute,
Charter or By-Laws prescribing the form of the
contract or the mode of executing it were not
complied with by the officer acting for the
corporation in the execution of the contract. In
other words, any informality in executing a
contract is waived, and cannot be set us as a
defense where the corporation has accepted and
obtained the benefits of the contract."

Cases from several different jurisdictions, not
including Utah were cited insupport of said rule.
In summary, Plaintiff contends:
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The agreement was properly admitted because

Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc. against whom it was being construed, admitted it and the Defendant Peterson was not
competent to object to it.
B.

Even if Joe's Valley, Inc. had not admitted

it, and if they had in fact object to it, Plaintiff's string
of proof is complete because the By-Laws gave the President
the right to make contracts. And this contract was made by
said President.
C.

Absent such By-Laws, Plaintiff's string

of proof is complete because of President Julian Taylor's
ostensible authority to act for the corporation.
D.

Even if the sales contract was otherwise

inadmissable, it was admissable as an act of the corporation,
because the corporation had the benefit of the contract and
could not take such benefit and at the same time deny the
contract.
E.

Finally, it was competent to admit the

contract, absent the minute entry authorizing the execution
thereof, by the Board of Directors of the corporation because
the records of the corporation were carelessly and
imperfectly kept.
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POINT IV
TO SUCCESSFULLY ASSERT HIS PROPERTY INTEREST IN
THE MARINA PROPERTY, DEFENDANT PETERSON MUST
ESTABLISH AND PROVE HIS OWN CHAIN OF TITLE
OF WHICH THE SALES CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF IS
AN ESSENTIAL LINK.
It is clear that Plaintiff is the original owner
of the Marina property -- he obtained it from the government
and built it with his own hands (T 6).

He testified that

except for the execution of the sales contract (Ex. 2) and
his actions pursuant thereto, he never transferred it to
Joe's Valley Marina, Inc. or Joe's Valley, Inc. and that
he never received stock of the corporation by either name
(T 64-65).

There was no evidence introduced by Defendant

Peterson or otherwise of a transfer out of Plaintiff to
the corporation other than the execution of the sales contract
and acts pursuant thereto.

Inasmuch as the Defendant Peterson

claims an Interest in the property through an agreement with
Defendant Joers Valley, Inc. it would seem that he would be
anxious to admit proof of the only channel through which that
Defendant could have obtained title to it, to-wit: the sales
agreement to which it objects so strenuously.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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This Court has many times declared the familiar
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rule, that in an action to quiet title which this action,
at least as between Plaintiff Thomas and Defendant Peterson,
essentially is, that a Claimant must succeed by virtue of the
strength of his own title rather than on the weakness of
the competing claimant's title. Mercur Coalition Mining
Company vs. Cannon 112 U 13, 184 P. 2d 341; Homeowners
Loan Corporation vs Dudley, 105 U 208, 141 P. 2d 160.
Defendant Peterson has here attempted to parlay
Plaintiff's failure to obtain the corporation minute records
where the corporation Secretary did not have it nor know
where it was, into an advoidance of the terms of the sales
agreement where his own claim of title is dependent upon the
corporation's title which in turn is dependent upon that
self same sales agreement.
POINT V
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT
ARE PRESUMED CORRECT, IT HAVING HEARD ALL OF
THE EVIDENCE AND OBSERVED THE WITNESSES.
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-305 Am Jur 2nd 4 recites the rule generally as follows:
!!

The scope of appellate review is largely influenced
by number of rebuttable presumptions, preiminent
among which is that which, at least where the
decision has been entered by a Court of general
jurisdiction, assumes the correctness of the
decision or ruling appealed from and the regularity
of the proceedings below. Thus, every reasonable
intendment favorable to a ruling of the Court below
will be indulged, and in the absence of affirmative
showing to the contrary, a ruling of the Court
below will be presumed to have been properly made
and for sound reasons.11

Numerous Utah cases have observed the rule in one
way or another.

See the list at footnote 3, Utah vs One

Porshe 526 P. 2d 918 (September 1974), (Utah report not yet
cited), at page 918. This perhaps obvious rule is here
stated to give Plaintiff an opportunity to note and discuss
some of the facts claimed by Defendant Peterson in his
brief with which Plaintiff does not agree and about which
there is contrary evidence.
First Defendant Peterson claims that the corporation
Joe's Valley, Marina, Inc. possessed the former assets of
Joefs Valley Marina -- but that is not so.

Plaintiff

testified that he operated and had possession of it until
the time that he executed the sales contract agreement; that
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-32"Marina", expanded the powers section and removed any
•preemptive rights.
- "-. -

_, ,;

:

f

,. .. :
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. •
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At page 4 of Appellant's brief, he claims

the Plaintiff claims the transfer by the sales agreement
from Joe's Valley Marina, Inc. to Joe's Valley, Inc. which
is simply not so.

The sales agreement is from Plaintiff

personally to the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc. (Ex. 2). ;
Apparently his purpose was to visit some corporate rules
regarding bulk sales on Joe's Valley Marina, Inc. because
he then claims those rules were not observed, (page 7
Appellant's brief).

.

v

_:

He attempts the same thing regarding purported
r. rules regarding the sale of real estate at page. 9 and 10
of his brief, but that attempt is specious for the same
reason, to-wit:

the sale was not from Joe's Valley

Marina, Inc. but from Plaintiff personally. ,,t
At page 15 of his brief, Appellant refers to the
corporation as Plaintiff's, but the Articles of Incorporation
(Ex. 3) and By-Laws (Ex. 4) will show that the Plaintiff was
•only one of twelve Directors; he never had stock; he was
not the President, and he did not choose or direct the
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accountants or the attorneys for the corporation (T 17, 39,
44 5 73) -- it seems less than fair to claim that he was
dealing with the corporation as though it was his.
At page 16, he asserts that the corporation sought
to set the sales contract aside -- but the corporation admitted
the execution of the contract (R 86).

It is only the Appellant

Peterson who wishes to set the contract aside.
At page 17, Appellant Peterson aludes to the trial
Courts Memorandum Decision that Plaintiff was a 1007o stock
holder of Joe's Valley Marina, Inc. As is clear from all of
Plaintiff's testimony, he did not ever receive stock in the
corporation, or transfer anything into it while it was Marina,
Inc. (T 64-66).

It is true that Plaintiff was the owner of

the Marina property, which was an intended asset of the
corporation and the subject of a pre-incorporation agreement
(T 7, 6, 8). Plaintiff urges that that is the sense of Plaintiff's
testimony, and the meaning of the Court's comment in the
Memorandum Decision.
At page 17 of his brief, Appellant Peterson says,
r

!And it does not appear that the Plaintiff treated
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the property as his own in his individual
tax returns for 1971 and 1972."

That is a particularly devious statement since
it is technically true, but terribly misleading.

The

truth is that the converse also does not appear -- in
fact that is nothing in the record about how the Plaintiff
treated the property on his tax returns.
Appellant Peterson asserts at page 19 of his
brief that the Plaintiff allowed the corporation to carry
on its existence as though it owned all of the referred to
property, but that is neither true nor, except for Defendant
Peterson's claim that he was mislead, is not supported in
the record.

With respect to Peterson's being mislead, the

Court correctly found that Peterson had full knowledge of
the contract as is more fully argued at another point herein.
(Argument Point II at pages 13-15). Appellant Peterson seems
to say at Page 27 of his brief that he was precluded from
performing the conditions of his lease and that he failed
to obtain the approval of the Forest Service by reason of
the acts of Plaintiff or the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc. or others -- but such assertion was not proved and is not
supported in the record.
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-35Appellant Peterson's points II, III and IV depend
on the distortion of facts asserted by him.

With respect to

Point II, that the contract was voidable because Plaintiff
breached his fiduciary duty, first, the corporation did not
seek to avoid the contract -- see its answer (R 84-68).
Second, the corporation was formed to take advantage of a
pre-incorporation agreement regarding the sale of the Marina
property -- the sales contract was only an affirmation by
the corporation of the earlier agreement.

Third, Plaintiff

was in any event only one of twelve Directors of the
corporation; and not the moving party in its corporate
affairs and hardly in a position to self deal with the
corporation.
With respect to Point III that the Marina property
was already the property of Joe's Valley Marina, Inc. -that is only a distortion of the facts.

Plaintiff testified

that he owned all of the Marina property personally; that he
only transferred or agreed to transfer it by the sales
agreement in question and the pre-incorporation agreement
that preceded it.

The change from Joe's Valley Marina, Inc.

to Joe's Valley, Inc. was only a change of name and a small
modification of the Articles of Incorporation.
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With respect to Point IV which Plaintiff construes
to be that Plaintiff allowed the corporation to carry on its
existence as if it owned the Marina property and should
therefore be estopped to deny it -- even if there was
evidence in support of that claim, which Plaintiff denies,
the only person to assert said estoppel is the Defendant
Peterson who the evidence clearly shows was aware of the
sales agreement. (Ex. 2).

CONCLUSION
Judge Sheya heard the testimony, observed the
witnesses and decided the matter correctly.

His decision

should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted:

., %.,aXJl £ M — ( —
GERALD E. NIELSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
840 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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